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THE ELUSIVE REFORMATION
Abdelwahab El-Affendi
The overriding political problem with modern Islam is not just the em-
barrassing absence of democracy in most Muslim countries, but the more
basic failure to provide any form of stable, and even minimally consen-
sual governance at all. This problem is so glaring and of such long
standing that it is difficult to dismiss out of hand the role of such “pre-
political” factors as culture and, in particular, religion in explaining it.
The more weight we ascribe to these “prepolitical” factors, the greater
the need appears to be for a radical intellectual and ethical reorientation
of Islam. But the argument that such a reorientation should take the
form of an “Islamic Reformation” is nevertheless a precarious one.
Despite the achievements of scholars who have followed the sunnah
(tradition) of Max Weber in using religion to explain social phenomena,
it remains risky for social scientists to double as amateur theologians,
especially when they want to speak in a prescriptive mode. This need
not discourage us from dabbling in theology, as long as we remember
that theology and political sociology are profoundly different enterprises.
The greater risk is not that theology will corrupt social science, but the
reverse. Social scientists have a dangerous tendency to take such theo-
logical concepts as “the rule of God” at face value and then run away
with them—projecting, for example, simplistic contrasts with the po-
litical concept of “the rule of man.”
The question of whether liberal democracy can be given a “truly”
Islamic basis is unanswerable, since there cannot conceivably be any
Islamic democratic movement which is untouched by the influences and
challenges of Western liberal-democratic thought and practice. Mean-
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while, any modern Islamic reform movement trumpeting its liberal-
democratic potential begs the question of whether religious-cum-cultural
reform is a precondition for democratization, since to cite favorably the
presumed liberal-democratic potential of a particular interpretation of
Islam is to assume that there is already a broad Muslim constituency for
liberalism and democracy as things desirable in and of themselves.
Not all those classified as “Muslim liberals” base their liberalism on
theological assumptions; in fact the majority do not. But the conceptual
amalgam that travels under the “Muslim liberal” label is more problem-
atic than the easy combination of adjectives suggests—and not only
because the term “liberal” is as hotly contested as it is. Islamic liberal-
ism is often defined as a tendency that “share[s] common concerns with
Western liberalism,”1 in particular the privileging of “rational discourse”
that aims primarily at “agreement based on goodwill” among partici-
pants in public life.2 This appears to be a circular definition, tautologically
generating the conclusion that “liberal Islam” is more congenial to democ-
racy than other modes of Islam. If Muslim liberals are by definition
those who share Western liberal democratic ideals, and if non-liberals
are those who do not, then it goes without saying that “Muslim liberal-
ism” is the intra-Islamic tendency that would promote liberal democracy
within Islam.
It is significant, though, that reality does not accord with this “tau-
tology.” Those groups and thinkers who have gone the furthest in
promoting “liberal” theologies within Islam (like the Ahmadis in Paki-
stan, the Bahais in Iran, or the Republican Brothers in Sudan) have been
less inclined toward modern liberal democracy than toward positions of
the sort taken by such early-modern Western liberals as John Locke,
Jeremy Bentham, or James Madison, all of whom were at best “reluc-
tant democrats.”3 Nor is it difficult to see why, since most of these
reformist schools of Islam were often marginalized and even persecuted.
Liberalism—understood broadly as support for individual autonomy
and the political and civil liberties that underpin it—has not always been
democracy-friendly.4 Liberals have often worried that empowered but
misguided masses can threaten fundamental rights and liberties, espe-
cially property rights. In spite of the intimate relationship that is now
thought to hold between liberalism and democracy, significant tensions
persist between them—with certain tenets of classical liberalism even
being arguably “profoundly hostile to democracy.”5
Governance and Belief
It goes without saying that Islamic teachings, traditionally under-
stood, certainly conflict with aspects of Western liberalism, but that
does not in itself mean that they are an obstacle to democracy. Any set
of religious beliefs, even beliefs based on caste stratification, could be
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compatible with democracy (understood as consensual popular rule) if
they are shared by all members of the community. On the other hand,
differing and incompatible versions of beliefs would make democratic
consensus difficult, regardless of their content.
One could, at this point, venture the counterintuitive thesis that not
only Islam, but all religion is essentially “democratic,” in the sense that
religion as a matter of individual conscience can only be espoused freely.
Religious communities—from the early Hebrews to early Christians,
and down to the Pilgrims, Mormons, and Nation of Islam—depended
for their existence on the continuous promotion of consensus. Other-
wise they tended to fragment very quickly. Like any source of moral or
spiritual values, religion can be deployed as an element of intimidation
and coercion against dissidents (actual and potential), but that can only
happen once the values in question have been widely accepted and have
become constitutive of the community itself. The central problem that
religion poses for democracy (or any form of government) is that strongly
held beliefs or loyalties can also make consensus hard to secure.
Muslim communities have responded positively both to democracy
and to most aspects of liberalism. Limits on state authority, the separa-
tion of powers, and constitutionalism in general, have traditionally found
strong support in Muslim circles. For evidence one could point to the
constitutionalist movements that emerged in Iran, Egypt, and the
Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century. And upon gaining inde-
pendence from colonial rule, almost all Muslim countries adopted some
form of proto-democratic rule. Many leading reformers put forth theo-
logical-political arguments for the compatibility of democracy and Islam.
For the most part, however, these countries were run by instinctive lib-
erals who did not bother to offer religious arguments for their political
beliefs. The “founding fathers” in countries like Pakistan and Malaysia
fit this mould, as did the monarchies of post-independence Iraq, Mo-
rocco, Egypt, Jordan, and Libya. The subsequent collapse of
proto-democracy from one Muslim country to the next coincided with
general trends in the wider Third World, and had more to do with secu-
lar ideologies such as socialism and nationalism rather than shifts in
religious thought.
All dictatorships in the Muslim world in fact remain secular—as they
must, since dictatorships are by definition political systems that subor-
dinate all values and considerations, including religious ones, to regime
survival. Even where dictatorships venture a theological justification,
they do not lose this secular character. Ayatollah Khomeini’s doctrine
of the “absolute jurisdiction of the jurist” (Mutlaq Velayat-e-Faqih),
enunciated in 1988, demonstrates as much, based as it is on the argu-
ment that the survival of the Islamic state is the supreme value to which
all other religious obligations must be subordinated. But unless the theo-
logical principle in question has real majority support, the regime’s
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continuing survival cannot be ascribed to its theological credentials,
but more to its secret police or petrodollars.
The Islamist Challenge
In the twentieth century, a rising number of Muslim thinkers did at-
tempt to produce religious arguments against democracy and in favor
of more “authentic” Islamic models, such as that of shura (consultative
system) or various kinds of guardianship by religious scholars. Sayyid
Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi (1903–79) from the Indian subcontinent, Sayyid
Qutb (1906–66) from Egypt, and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1900–
89) from Iran argued that the democratic idea of popular sovereignty
directly contradicted the sovereignty of God.6 Yet all these authors ad-
vocated some form of modern constitutional practice—albeit always with
the proviso that some (variously defined) religious authority should have
a final veto on the decisions of elected bodies. But these thinkers, like
those theologians who serve as apologists for existing autocracies to-
day, have enjoyed little popular support.
The rising popularity of Islamist trends has posed a dual challenge
for democratization. On one hand, it has created a fear among liberals
that democratic forms may hand power to illiberal Islamists. On the
other, despots have used the Islamist threat to resist pressures to de-
mocratize—often with support from some local liberals and major
foreign powers. Moreover, disillusionment among many Muslims with
contemporary experiments in Islamicization (in Iran, Pakistan, Af-
ghanistan, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia) has given rise to new liberal
tendencies that claim the Islamic mantle and marshal religious argu-
ments. Some commentators see these new tendencies as sure signs of
a shift toward liberalism in the Muslim world, especially in Iran, where
disillusionment with the Islamic “republic of virtue” is at its most
acute:
If, as the Christian West has shown, widespread disenchantment with
attempts to create a “City of God” on Earth ultimately fuels the rise of a
democratic “City of Man,” then Islamic civilization is on the verge of a
decisive, and familiar, breakthrough.7
Charles Kurzman distinguishes three strands of Islamic liberalism.
One argues that Islamic teachings are essentially liberal; another argues
that Islamic teachings are neutral toward liberalism; a third accepts that
there is a conflict between liberalism and traditional Islam but argues
that they can be reconciled through a process of mutual reinterpreta-
tion.8 The new trends belong to this third or “revisionist” strand—a
category represented by important movements such as Nahdatul Ulama
in Indonesia and the reformism behind President Mohammad Khatami
in Iran, as well as by individuals such as Iran’s Abdul Karim Soroush.
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For our purposes, the first two categories can be referred to as modes of
“traditional” Islamic liberalism and the third, as “critical” Islamic liber-
alism.
Yet one can point beyond these to a fourth category, one exemplified
by emerging parties such as Justice and Development in Turkey and
Morocco or Ennahada in Tunisia, movements such as the Muslim Youth
Movement of Malaysia or certain splinters from the Muslim Brother-
hood in Egypt and Syria, and personalities such as Tarek al-Bichri in
Egypt. These groups combine traditional with critical liberalism in that
they show a full awareness of, and sympathy with, the revisionist trends,
but they do not themselves explicitly make revisionist arguments. In-
stead, they self-consciously (if often tacitly) prefer to postpone or bypass
the thorny issues implied by a commitment to both liberalism and Islam.
The positive aspect of these new trends is that they have helped to
create prodemocracy coalitions by deliberately removing some of Islam’s
most contentious theological-political issues from the table, at least for
the short to medium term. But unlike most traditional Islamic liberals,
who were often unaware of or unconcerned with divisive issues, the
new Islamic liberals are acutely aware of them and know that at some
point they will need to defend their own stance on these hard questions,
even if it is wise to get them off the front burner of politics for now. In
places like Iran, the new liberalism has managed to generate broad coa-
litions that encompass critical Islamic liberalism, traditional liberalism,
and even plain secular liberalism. As a result, it has managed to secure
wide popular support for its programs of reform, as indicated by the
landslide victory Khatami secured in the last presidential and parlia-
mentary elections in Iran.
The rise of such a coalition does not, of course, prevent rivals from
raising the issues that the new movements have wanted to keep off the
agenda, and thus from reopening the battles anew. But these critics are
less likely to mobilize significant popular support, and so less likely to
destabilize the system. Recent elections in Turkey, Egypt, Indonesia,
Morocco, Pakistan, and Malaysia have shown that radical parties, such
as the Islamic Party of Malaysia or Fazilet in Turkey, do not enjoy sig-
nificant popular support. Violent Islamist organizations, such as Egypt’s
Islamic Group, are even more isolated. The resulting stability may make
it possible to debate these issues in a calmer atmosphere and maybe
even to resolve them.
It can, in conclusion, be said that an “Islamic Reformation” is neither
necessary nor sufficient for enabling Muslims to build stable and con-
sensual political institutions. A reformation may be a desirable thing;
that is a matter for Muslim believers to decide. But its prospect is un-
likely to improve the outlook for political stability in the short term.
Like the Christian Reformation before it, it would more likely be a daunt-
ingly divisive and bloody affair.
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